Due Process and Employee Safety: Conflict in OSHA Enforcement Procedures by unknown
Due Process and Employee Safety: Conflict in
OSHA Enforcement Procedures
The controversial Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970'
continues to capture the attention of legislators, courts and com-
mentators. 2 Millions of dollars are at stake-the amounts employers
have paid out for mandated improvements
3 and penalty assessments.4
Employers have recently launched constitutional challenges to the
Act,a alleging in some cases that the enforcement procedures violate
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Act].
2. See, e.g., Hearings on the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Oversight
and Proposed Amendments) Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Oversight
Hearings]; M. STOKES, LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ACT OF 1970, at 73-85 (1972); Moran, Occupational Safety and Health Standards as Federal
Law: The Hazards of Haste, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777 (1974); McClintock & Bohrnsen,
Constitutional Challenges, 9 GONZAGA L. REV. 361 (1974); Comment, Occupational Safety
and Health Standards, 9 GONZAGA L. REV. 493 (1974); Note, The Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970: Some Unresolved Issues and Potential Problems, 41 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 304 (1972).
3. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1975, § 3 (Business and Finance) at 5, col. 1.
4. From April 28, 1971, to December 1974, 134,505 citations were issued, proposing
penalties of $17,493,262. Of the proposed penalties, S12,704,619 have been collected. 4
BNA Occ. SAF. & HEALTH REP. 1271 (1975).
5. Challenges have included unsuccessful allegations that the penalties, though desig-
nated civil by Congress, are criminal in nature, thereby requiring all the safeguards of
criminal procedure in the enforcement proceedings. See, e.g., Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v.
OSAHRC, 2 BNA Occ. SAF. & HEALTH REP. 1283 (3d Cir., Nov. 4, 1974), vacated for re-
hearing, 2 BNA Occ. SAF. & HEALTH REP. 1445 (3d Cir., Dec. 20, 1974); Lance Roofing Co.
v. Hodgson, 343 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1070 (1972) (three-judge court;
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies). See McClintock & Bohrnsen,
supra note 2, at 271-93; Comment, OSHA Penalties: Some Constitutional Considerations,
10 IDAHO L. REV. 223 (1974); Comment, OSHA: Employer Beware, 10 Hous. L. REv. 426
(1973). A more general discussion can be found in Charney, The Need for Constitutional
Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478 (1974); see
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402-04 (1938) (judicial explanation of the difference
between civil and criminal penalties).
A second constitutional attack alleging a possible Seventh Amendment conflict was
suggested by Judge Gibbons in his dissenting opinion to Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSAHRC,
supra. Judge Gibbons argued that because the Act provides for civil penalties resulting
in an in personam money judgment, a de novo trial in the courts is necessary. In two
recent cases, Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, made clear that actions requiring
a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment could, at the discretion of Congress, be com-
mitted to an administrative agency, thereby eliminating the need for a Seventh Amend-
ment jury trial. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
Finally, the Act authorizes entry without a warrant, thereby presenting a potential
fourth amendment violation. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v.
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); M. STOKES, supra note 2, at 83; Hornberger, Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 9-11 (1972); cf. Note, Area Search
Warrants in Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara, 84 YALE L.J. 355 (1974). The
issue, however, has been mooted by the decision of the Secretary to obtain a warrant if
the employer refuses to permit an inspector to enter. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1974). For a
discussion of the effect of this regulation upon the requirement that no prior notice be
given of an inspection, see Comment, Occupational Safety and Health Inspections, 9
GONZAGA L. REv. 555, 556-58 (1974).
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due process." Perhaps the most compelling due process concern arises
from the possibility of transforming a penalty of $1000 into one of
over $100,000 solely by exercising the statutorily provided right of
appeal.7 Congress has considered this problem, but has yet to arrive at
a positive solution.8
This Note will analyze the due process allegations, keeping them al-
ways in the perspective of the Act's primary purpose: providing for
the safety of employees.9 The precise problem is how.to minimize the
dangers to employees while preserving due process for the employer
who may be forced to make irretrievable expenditures before he has a
hearing and judicial review. Statutory amendments will then be sug-
gested and examined.
I. The Enforcement Proceedings
In order to assure safe working conditions, the Act empowers the
Secretary of Labor, through his designees, to inspect workplaces10 for
violations of safety and health standards." If a violation is found, a
citation 12 is issued which often carries a proposed penalty.' 3 The cita-
tion describes the dangerous condition and specifies an "abatement
period," a reasonable number of days for the employer to put an end
6. E g., Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSAHRC, 2 BNA OcC. SAF. 9- HEALTH REP. (3d Cir.,
Nov. 4, 1974); McClean Trucking Co. v. OSAHRC, 503 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1974); Lance
Roofing Co. v. Hodgson, 343 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
7. See Lance Roofing Co. v. Hodgson, 343 F. Supp. 685, 689 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
8. For examples of proposed amendments, see 4 BNA Occ. SAF. & HEALTH REP. 380,
395, 420, 493, 529 (1974); S. 2823, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 16508, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972); H.R. 15539, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 15353, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972); H.R. 14956, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 13926, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See
1972 Oversight Hearings 238 (testimony of Richard Berman, Labor Relations Attorney
for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce); 1972 Oversight Hearings 326 (testimony of Sen.
Curtis).
9. See, e.g., Brennan v. Southern Contractors Serv., 492 F.2d 498, 501 (5th Cir. 1974).
10. Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)(1) (1970):
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting
appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized- (1)
to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment,
construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed
by an employee of an employer.
If the employer objects to the inspection, the Secretary has administratively decided to
obtain a warrant before entering. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1974).
11. Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970). For examples of standards which have been
promulgated, see 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1974).
12. Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 658 (1970).
13. Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1970). The amount of the penalty is determined
by reference to § 17 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). Section 17 provides for a penalty
of up to 510,000 for a willful violation, § 17(a); up to $1000 for a serious violation, §
17(b); up to $I000 for a nonserious violation, § 17(c); and up to $1000 for every day of
non-abatement, after the abatement period set forth in the citation has run, § 17(d). It is
not necessary to propose a penalty after issuing a citation except in the case of a serious
violation.
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to the violation. 14 The employer is given 15 working days during which
to contest the citation or the proposed penalty.' 5 Should the employer
decide not to contest during the 15 working day period, the citation
and penalty become self-executing and not subject to review by any
agency or court. 16 However, if the employer does contest the citation
or the penalty, he will be given a hearing before a judge of the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Review Commission 17 (OSAHRC). An
order of the Commission judge may be reviewed by the three-member
OSAHRC.' 8 The decision of the Commission, or of the judge, if the
Commission denies review, is appealable to the federal court of ap-
peals for the appropriate circuit or for the District of Columbia.'"
II. Due Process Considerations
Constitutional due process requirements must be satisfied in de-
termining the penalties and orders directed at an employer, regardless
of whether the decision is made at the administrative or judicial level.
20
14. Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 658 (1970). For a discussion of abatement, see Comment, OSHA
Enforcement: Citations and Penalties, 9 GONZACA L. REv. 571, 573-74 (1974).
15. Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1970). Section 5(a) of S. 2823, supra note 8, proposes
extending the period to 30 days.
16. Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1970):
If within fifteen working days from the receipt of the notice issued by the Secretary
the employer fails to notify the Secretary that he intends to contest the citation or
proposed assessment of penalty... the citation and the assessment, as proposed,
shall be deemed a final order of the Commission and not subject to review by any
court or agency.
17. Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970). The judge here is the hearing examiner
noted in Act § 12(e), 29 U.S.C. § 661(d) (1970). Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 2200.I(f) (1974).
the term judge is used. The judges are distinct from the three members of the Com-
mission. Service of the notice of contest must be made not only upon the Secretary, but
also upon affected employees, 29 C.F.R. § 2200.7(g) (1974), or their authorized representa-
tive, 29 C.F.R. § 2200.7(f) (1974). The Secretary must file a complaint within 20 days
of the notice of contest, 29 C.F.R. § 2200.33(a) (1974), and the employer must answer the
complaint within 15 days after it has been served upon him, 29 C.F.R. § 2200.33(b) (1974).
18. Such review is discretionary. The petition must be submitted within 25 days of
the Commission judge's decision. Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970); 29 C.F.R. §
2200.91(b) (1974). Unless a member of the Commission decides to grant review, the
order of the judge becomes final 30 days after its issuance, with the silence of the Com-
mission constituting a denial of the petition. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.91(d) (1974). If the Commis-
sion grants review, no order will become final until 30 days after the judge's decision has
been reviewed. Ordinarily, there is no oral argument before the Commission. 29 C.F.R.
§ 2200.93(a) (1974).
19. An appeal must be taken within 60 days of the issuance of the decision. The
decision of the court of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court on the grant of
a writ of certiorari. Act § 11(a), 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970). Civil penalties adjudged to be
due after the appeal process has ended may be recovered by the Secretary in civil silts in
the appropriate U.S. district court, where no review of the merits is permitted. Act §
10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1970). See, e.g., United States v. J.M. Rosa Constr. Co., 1 BNA
Occ. Saf. & Health Cas. 1188 (D.C. Conn. 1973).
20. See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975)
(garnishment); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (license
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Exactly what constitutes due process may depend on the circum-
stances,21 but an evidentiary hearing is required 22 when a right is ter-
minated2 3 or property taken.2
4
Since the courts have the right to test the constitutionality of the
actions of the other two branches of government,25 judicial review of
the administrative hearing is necessary. This review need not include
a de novo trial of the facts. 2 6 If the Act had only to meet these two due
process requirements, it would be unobjectionable; both an evidentiary
hearing and judicial review are available.
Employers, however, have mounted other attacks. Some have alleged
that due process is denied because the Secretary simultaneously func-
tions as prosecutor and fact finder.27 Since the Commission or one of
its judges reviews the violations, the allegation must be based on an
suspension); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (denial of the right to
purchase alcohol); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of public assistance
payments); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (trust modi-
fication); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914) (foreclosure).
21. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975) (students); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974) (prisoners).
22. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
23. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
24. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
25. There is controversy over the meaning of the provisions of U.S. CONsT. art. III
which vest in Congress authority over the creation of inferior federal courts and over the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: namely, whether Congress could in some
cases prevent judicial review entirely. See, e.g., Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
Nonetheless there are sound reasons for arguing that the right of judicial review cannot
be deprived by any statute. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932); Estep v.
United States, 327 U.S. 114, 120 (1946); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298
U.S. 38, 51-52 (1936); Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 335-36 (1932); Ng Fung
Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 282 (1922); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253
U.S. 287, 289 (1920). But see Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 423
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., dubitante). For a discussion of the various arguments see 4 K.
DAvis, ADMINiSTRrATiVE LAW TREATISE § 28.19 (1958); Hart, supra. See generally Saferstein,
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARv.
L. REv. 367 (1968); Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972). In McClean Trucking
Co. v. OSAHRC, 503 F.2d 8, 11 (4th Cir. 1974) and Lance Roofing Co. v. Hodgson, 343
F. Supp. 685, 689-90 (N.D. Ga. 1972), the courts placed emphasis on the fact that judicial
review was available. The Lance court strongly implied that the Act would be uncon-
stitutional without it.
26. See, e.g., Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932); Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22 (1932); N.A. Woodworth Co. v. Kavanaugh, 102 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Mich. 1952),
a! 'd per curtain, 202 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1953); cf. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909). For a detailed discussion, see Goldschmid, An Evaluation
of the Present and Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Ad-
mninistrative Agencies, 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 896, 899 (1972). For a contrary view, including a listing of
all federal agencies able to levy penalties without de novo judicial review, see Judge
Gibbon's dissenting opinion in Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSAHRC, 2 BNA Occ. SAF.
& HEALTH REP. 1283, 1294-95 n.10 (3d Cir., Nov. 4, 1974).
27. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 60, Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSAHRC, Civil No. 73-2249
(5th Cir., filed May 30, 1973); cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (At-
torney General issuing search warrant in capacity of justice of the peace); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (neutral and detached hearing body required for parole
revocation determination).
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assumption that the Commission is unable to function independently
of the inspectors. 28 The Commissioners, however, are appointed by the
President, and the Secretary has no power to remove them. Moreover,
their decisions are reviewable only in the court of appeals. 29 Employers
therefore are able to have a hearing which satisfies due process because
the Commission is independent of the Secretary.3"
Employers have also alleged that the penalties violate due process
because they are self-executing.3 ' But that does not make the procedure
violative of due process as long as there is an opportunity for a hearing
before the penalty becomes effective and collectible.3 2 If the employer
chooses not to contest within the 15 working days allotted, he will
have waived the right to a hearing; structuring such a waiver into the
procedure is not violative of due process.
33
Even though the formal procedures of the statute satisfy the fore-
going due process requirements, a "chilling factor" may in practical
effect deny a hearing and judicial review; herein lies the serious due
process objection. The chilling factor is the possibility that the abate-
ment period will expire before a hearing and judicial review have been
completed. 34 If an employer does not abate within the time period
28. E.g., Brief for Petitioner at 15, Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSAHRC, Civil No. 73-2249
(5th Cir., filed May 30, 1973).
29. Act §§ 11, 12, 29 U.S.C. §§ 660, 661 (1970).
30. See 116 CONG. REc. 37326-27 (1970) (remarks of Sen. H. Williams); Moran, The
Legal Process for Enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 9
GONZAGA L. REV. 349, 352 (1974): "'Review Commission' is synonymous with 'court.' It
is the trial court for alleged violations of the Act...." See Dale M. Madden Constr., Inc.
v. Hodgson, 502 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1974) (example of conflict between the Secretary and
the Commission). The Administrative Procedure Act allows for contradictory roles within
one agency. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (1970). Administrative agencies can levy penalties as long
as due process is maintained. For a general discussion, see 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTMTIVE LAW
TREATISE § 2.13, at 134 (1958): "[IThe administrative imposition of penalties is common-
place..."; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 112-14 (student ed.
1965).
31. E.g., Brief for Petitioner at 60, Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSAHRC, Civil No. 73-2249
(5th Cir., filed May 30, 1973).
32. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
33. Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSAHRC, 2 BNA Occ. SAF. & HEALTH REP. 1283, 1288 (3d
Cir., Nov. 4, 1974); cf. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 789-93 (1948).
34. Another potential chilling factor, not considered in the text, is the power claimed
by the Commission and its judges to increase penalties over what the Secretary proposes.
The power is derived from the use of the word "modifying" in Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. §
659(c) (1970). In the following cases, proposed penalties have been increased: e.g., REA
Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1974) (proposed penalty of ;900 increased
to $1000 by hearing examiner); The Marino Dev. Corp., 2 BNA OcC. SAF. & HEALTH REr.
1260 (Rev. Comm'n, Oct. 9, 1974) (proposed penalty of S500 raised to $700 by hearing
examiner, lowered back to $500 by the Review Commission); Republic Creosoting Co., 1
BNA Occ. Saf. & Health Cas. 1124 (Rev. Comm'n 1973) (proposed penalty of S600 raised
to £1300 by hearing examiner, but overruled by Review Commission which vacated the
entire penalty). In the following cases penalties were reduced: Skyline Lumber Co., 2
BNA Occ. SAF. & HEALTH REP. 3034 (hearing examiner, June 5, 1974) (from S565 to S240);
Tony Volante Sewer Serv., 2 BNA Occ. SAF. & HEALTH REP. 3079 (hearing examiner, July
15, 1974) (from $700 to .$200); Martin Masonry Co., 2 BNA Occ. SAF. & HEALTI REP. 1342
1384
Vol. 84: 1380, 1975
Due Process and Employee Safety
allotted in the citation, a non-abatement penalty accumulates at a rate
of up to $1000 a day.3 5 It is not uncommon for abatement periods to
be only 30 days. 36 In contrast, the average time from the day a contest
notice is filed until a decision is rendered is 114 days for a judge, 198
days for a judge and the Commission,37 and approximately an addi-
tional year if review extends to a court of appeals. 38 With this time
disparity, a $1000 penalty could easily be transformed into one of over
$100,000 due to non-abatement.
Currently, however, a stay of the running of the abatement period is
usually granted during both the hearing and review stages. With such
a stay, the employer has no fear of penalties accumulating because the
allotted number of days will be available after the Commission or
court has come to a decision. The chilling effect only occurs, therefore,
when the employer, during either the administrative or judicial pro-
ceedings, must go forward without a stay.
At the administrative level, the abatement period does not begin to
run until a final order of the Commission has been entered.39 How-
(Rev. Comm'n, Nov. 1, 1974) (from $600 to S150). As of September 1972, 365 decisions had
been rendered with 167 modifications, 13 percent of those being increases over the
proposed penalties and 87 percent being decreases. 1972 Oversight Hearings 330 (testimony
of Robert D. Moran, Chairman, OSAHRC).
The legality of the Commission's modifying power is put in question by North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 7.1 (1969). There the judge was directed not to increase a
previously ordered sentence upon the reconviction of an individual who had successfully
withdrawn his guilty plea, unless reasons justifying the increase were provided. The Court
feared that the possibility of vindictive increases would "chill the exercise of basic con-
stitutional rights." Id. at 724, citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968).
However, an exact analogy to Pearce is foreclosed because the Commission and its judges
justify increases with reasons. E.g., The Marino Dev. Corp., 2 BNA Occ. SAF. & HEALTH
REP. 1260 (Rev. Comm'n, Oct. 9, 1974). Furthermore, the small size of the increments
mitigates employers' fears. See, e.g., REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.
1974) (5100); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 2 BNA 0cc. SAF. & HEALTH REP. 1388 (Rev.
Comm'n, Nov. 20, 1974) (,65). Other than for willful violations, the maximum penalty is
S1000 so that any increase must be less than that amount. See note 13 supra; cf. Wetmore
& Parman, Inc., 1 BNA Occ. Saf. 9- Health Cas. 1099 (Rev. Comm'n 1973) (Commission
cannot change level of violation). For a discussion of the chilling effect of increasing
penalties, see McClintock & Bohrnsen, supra note 2, at 370, 394.
There is currently disagreement among the three members of the Commission as to
whether they have the power to increase penalties. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., supra. S.
2823, supra note 8, § 5(b), would replace "modifying" with "reducing."
The following cases involve challenges to the power of the Commission to increase
penalties: Secretary of Labor v. Don L. Cooney, Inc., Civil No. 73-2403 (9th Cir., filed
July 30, 1973), and Secretary of Labor v. California Stevedoring & Ballast Co., Civil No.
73-3103 (9th Cir., filed Nov. 1, 1973).
35. Act § 17(d), 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1970).
36. Lance Roofing Co. v. Hodgson, 343 F. Supp. 685, 689 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
37. Testimony of OSAHRC Chairman Moran, supra note 34, at 329. Expedited pro-
ceedings at the administrative level are possible, however. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.101 (1974).
38. Lance Roofing Co. v. Hodgson, 343 F. Supp. 685, 689 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
39. Act § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 659(b) (1970):
[The abatement] period shall not begin to run until the entry of a final order by the
Commission in the case of any review proceedings under this section initiated by
tlue employer in good faith and not solely for delay or avoidance of penalties ....
1385
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 1380, 1975
ever, the abatement period will be treated as having begun when the
citation was issued if the Secretary decides that the employer is con-
testing only the amount of the penalty, is initiating review without
good faith, or is appealing solely to delay or avoid penalties.40 In effect,
therefore, the Secretary can withdraw what is otherwise an automatic
stay.
Filing an appeal for judicial review does not act as an automatic stay
of the running of the abatement period.4' Rather, the court of appeals
has the discretionary power to grant a stay, if requested.4 2 The effect
The abatement period must extend beyond the 15 working day period provided to contest
a citation or a penalty. Paper Prod. Co., 2 BNA Occ. SAF. & HEALTH REP. 1126, 1127
(Rev. Comm'n, July 25, 1974); Kessler & Sons Constr. Co., 2 BNA Occ. SAF. 9- HEALTH
REP. 1096, 1097 (Rev. Comm'n, July 8, 1974).
40. Section 10(b) does not state who will determine the good faith of employers. See
note 39 supra. Though it might have been logical fbr the Commission to decide, the
Secretary has taken it upon himself to make the determination.
The-following excerpt from the COM'LIANCE OPERATIONS MANUAL [hereinafter cited as
MANUAL] pt. XI-6 (Jan. 1972) issued by the Office of Compliance, Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, U.S. Dep't of Labor, cited in McClintock & Bohrnsen, supra
note 2, at 368 n.29, explains the interpretation given §§ 10(b) and 17(d) by the Secretary in
making his determination.
It should be noted that if the employer contested only the amount of the proposed
penalty, or if there is a determination that the employer did not initiate the review
proceedings in good faith but solely for delay or avoidance of penalties, the "number
of days abated" will be calculated [from the day the citation was issued].
The MANUAL vests the power to make the above determinations in the designees of the
Secretary.
Determinations of what constitutes good faith have proven difficult for the Commis-
sion in other areas where the term is employed. The Marino Dev. Corp., 2 BNA Occ. SAF. &
HEALTH REP. 1260, 1261 (Rev. Comm'n, Oct. 9, 1974): "The phrase good faith is not
capable of precise definition but must be ascertained from the facts in each case." An
employer's statement to an inspector or an employee might intimate that his only reason
for contesting was to delay abatement. Such a statement could be reported before, during,
or after the citation is contested. Neither Act § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 659(b) (1970) nor the
MANUAL specifies when the power may be exercised. (No consideration need be given here
to the situation where only the amount of a penalty is contested, for such action im-
plicitly admits the violations in the citation; consequently there is no reason not to have
immediate abatement.)
41. Act § 11(a), 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
42. Id. For the general criteria used by a court of appeals in determining whether to
grant a stay, see Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1077 (8th Cir.
1974); Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 740 (5th Cir. 1972); Long v. Robinson, 432
F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1970):
[A] party seeking a stay must show (1) that he will likely prevail on the merits of
the appeal, (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury if the stay is denied, (3) that
other parties will not be substantially harmed by the stay, and (4) that the public
interest will be served by granting the stay.
In Lance Roofing Co. v. Hodgson, 343 F. Supp. 685, 689 (N.D. Ga. 1972), the three-judge
district court said:
We do not believe that any Court of Appeals today would relish the prospect of
having to consider a motion for a stay each time an employer appeals from a "final
order" of this Commission and we may assume that such stays will not be granted
routinely.
(emphasis supplied)
A stay of the abatement period can also be granted by the Commission prior to the
filing of an appeal, so that, if the abatement period were sufficient to last the length
of the appeal, there would be no need to petition the court of appeals for a stay. 29
C.F.R. § 2200.92(a) (1974). See, e.g., Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., I BNA Occ. Saf. & Health
Cas. 1326 (Rev. Comm'n 1973) (request for stay denied).
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of having to proceed without a stay is the same at either the administra-
tive or judicial level.
If an employer is denied a stay and the abatement period ends before
the proceeding terminates, he risks owing more than the sum of the
original penalty and the abatement cost, should a decision eventually
be rendered against him. For example, an employer may be faced with
an initial penalty of $1000 and an abatement cost of $10,000 on the one
hand, and a possible 100-day review period on the other, carrying ac-
cumulated non-abatement penalties of $100,000. This threat of non-
abatement penalties may coerce the employer into immediate abate-
ment. It would then still be open to him to contest the initial penalty,
of course, but where abatement costs are significant, the employer is
probably more concerned with contesting that cost than with the
original penalty.43 Coerced abatement would make an appeal futile.
The employer, having abated the hazard, would avoid the accumulating
penalties, but even a decision in his favor would not afford recovery
of the abatement expenditure.44 At the most, the decision would
provide precedent for parallel situations.
Thus coerced abatement, before an administrative hearing or judicial
review is completed, forecloses consideration of the merits. 45 The
procedural decision to deny a stay will bury the real issues.46 Like
an unreasonable filing fee, the threat of monumental penalties pre-
vents an employer from challenging a government order directed at
him. 47 That order directly affects the use of his property, diminish-
43. An employer might be concerned about an abatement cost which is less than the
initial penalty, but his interest in contesting it would be proportionally reduced. A small
abatement cost, however, could have great significance for an employer with many work
areas, all having the same alleged defect.
If the employer can feasibly cease operations in the affected area, abatement would
not be necessary, and penalties presumably would not accrue for non-abatement. A large
build-up in inventory might permit such a cessation.
44. Irretrievable expenditures would be necessary where work in an affected area
cannot be economically halted and no costless halfway measures are available. For
instance, if the ceiling in a building released dangerous asbestos fibers into the air, im-
mediate replacement would be necessary. If indefinite evacuation were financially un-
feasible, an employer would have to make significant expenditures. If halfway measures
are feasible, such as covering a hole in the floor with plywood, the maintenance of a
stay might be conditioned on putting them into effect.
45. If the stay is withdrawn by the Secretary, coercion may occur without any hearing.
Neither the Act nor the MANUAL, supra note 40, provides for any hearing before the
Secretary acts. At least when a preliminary injunction is issued in a situation of imminent
danger, the employer has such a hearing. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
46. The Act provides no apparent method for appealing the Secretary's decision to
withdraw the automatic stay. Lance Roofing Co. v. Hodgson, 343 F. Supp. 685, 690 n.4
(N.D. Ga. 1972). Nevertheless, the penalties subsequently assessed for non-abatement are
subject to review. Act §§ 10(b)-(c), 11, 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(b)-(c), 660 (1970).
47. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process denied persons wish-
ing to sue for divorce, but unable to pay the filing fee). For arguments that Boddie
should be broadly construed as requiring guaranteed access to the courts as part of due
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ing liquidity or substituting one form of property for another.48 Yet
the ability to have a hearing and judicial review, ostensibly provided in
the Act, is made so burdensome for the class of employers forced to
proceed without a stay that they may forego their constitutional right
to challenge the order. This burden works a substantial diminution of
an employer's right to a hearing. Unless justified by an exigent state
need, this burden denies the employer due process of law.
40
III. Maximizing Employee Safety
In providing for the possibility of withdrawing or denying a stay,
Congress intended to foster the goals of the Act.50 The health and lives
of employees are at stake and quick abatement is meant to minimize
the dangers which prompted passage of the program. Since the Act's
objectives embody an important governmental interest, severely limit-
process, see Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Rights (pts. I, II), 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1974 DUKE L.J. 527; Abram, Access
to the Judicial Process, 6 GA. L. REv. 247 (1972); cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74-
79 (1972) (double bond requirement created a substantial barrier to appeal, violating
Equal Protection Clause); 19 ViLL. L. Rtv. 340 (1973); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481
F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973) (EPA ordered not to impose penalties during the pendency of ad-
ministrative and judicial actions because such action was "fundamentally unfair"). But see
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (indigents unable to pay filing fee for bank-
ruptcy not denied due process). Analogous denials of due process can be found in the
criminal sector. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (imposing greater sentence
without reasons upon reconviction); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (plea of
not guilty created possibility of death sentence whereas guilty plea precluded it); cf. Brooks
v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Sen. H.
Williams, in opposing the exclusion of an automatic stay, foresaw the problem during
debate on the Act:
I believe the court will not generally let an appeal right be substantially nullified
by permitting a penalty to run while a case is under court review ....
116 CONG. REc. 37609 (1970).
48. Cf. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckels-
haus, 467 F.2d 349, 356 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) (EPA com-
pliance order must be subject to a hearing); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,
478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
49. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 740 (1975) (only students posing "a continu-
ing danger" may be suspended without notice or a hearing); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 555, 560 (1974) (prisoners' due process rights "may be diminished by the needs
and exigencies of the institutional environment," but disciplinary proceeding must in-
clude notice and a written record); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-64 & n.10 (1970)
("governmental interest in summary adjudication" outweighed by the impact of termi-
nating welfare benefits); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 88 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting
in part).
50. The widely quoted figures of 14,000 annual deaths and over two million annual
disabilities caused by work-related accidents provided by Secretary of Labor Schultz ex-
plain why Congress wanted abatement as quickly as possible. See H.R. REt'. No. 1765,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1970); Hearings on S. 2193 and S. 2788 Before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess.,
77 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; 116 CONG. REc. 37607 (1970) (re-
marks of Sen. Javits); note 47 supra (response of Sen. H. Williams).
Though the Act gives the court of appeals more discretion than the Secretary in
determining whether to force an employer to proceed without a stay, Congress's purpose
in coercing quick abatement is presumably the same at both levels.
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ing procedural safeguards might be justified if no way existed to as-
sure safety while affording a meaningful hearing and judicial review.
However, as will be explored in this and the next section, procedural
safeguards need not be diminished to achieve safety. The existence of
workable alternatives makes the burden on employers forced to pro-
ceed without a stay a violation of due process.
Congress provided three methods for correcting dangerous condi-
tions. First, in situations of imminent danger, the Secretary is em-
powered to seek a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order.5t This temporary relief, provided by the district courts, super-
sedes any abatement periods contained in a citation. Second, where the
potential for harm to employees is limited, delayed correction is ac-
ceptable and a stay of the abatement period can and should be provided
throughout the proceedings. Between these two methods lies a third
where a stay is withdrawn or denied. In this third category-between
imminent and limited dangers-injunctive relief is not available, but
quick corrective action nonetheless is desirable because employees may
be injured. An example of corrective action which is not sufficiently
urgent to mandate injunctive relief but might best be undertaken
quickly is a sprinkler system in a flammable fertilizer factory,2 The
danger, though not imminent, should be countered with quick abate-
ment because the lives of employees are endangered by the risk of fire.
In contrast, a ceiling currently releasing dangerous asbestos fibers into
the air, for example, presents an imminent danger justifying injunctive
relief.
When faced with a case where quick abatement is appropriate but
where the danger is not so immediate as to justify an injunction, it
makes sense for the Secretary and a court of appeals to be able to
consider withdrawing or denying a stay.53 In particular, when an
51. Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 662 (1970). See Oldham, OSHA May Not Work in "Imminent
Danger" Cases, 60 A.B.A.J. 690 (1974) (particular emphasis on the mandamus provisions).
ln.granting preliminary injunctive relief, due process is considered satisfied, due to the
exigencies of the situation, by an abridged hearing or the limited life of the order. See
Carroll v. President & Comm'rs, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). While the procedures involved in
granting preliminary injunctive relief do not violate due process, the coercive result does
unless justified by an imminent danger. In other words, the entire injunctive procedure
cannot be invoked consistently with due process except where there is an imminent
danger. See Allison v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1123, 1126 (5th Cir. 1972). See generally Develop-
ments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994 (1965).
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.109(i)(7)(t) (1974).
53. Congress could decide to dispense with the third category and allow hazards not
enjoinable to continue throughout the proceedings. This Note argues that the inter-
mediate method is both appropriate and necessary, and it assumes Congress's continued
interest in maintaining it. In fact, if the Secretary and the Commission were to guarantee
administratively that an employer will always proceed with a stay, Lance Roofing Co. v.
Hodgson, 343 F. Supp. 685, 689-90 (N.D. Ga. 1972), they would, in effect, be amending
the Act and defeating a congressional purpose. Cf. note 10 supra.
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employer's legal claim is dubious and the amount involved is not
significant when compared with his worth or earnings, there should
be no hesitation in forcing him to proceed without a stay. Such a
course of action creates a dilemma: coercing abatement by denying a
stay protects employees' health .and safety, but drastically impairs em-
ployers' procedural rights. Even employers with dubious legal positions
may ultimately be victorious. The present statutory scheme cannot
effectively give meaningful content to due process in all cases while
simultaneously satisfying the goal of protecting employees. More im-
portantly, narrowing the content of due process is unjustifiable be-
cause there are viable alternatives which allow safety to be achieved




The amendment to the Act currently before Congress, S. 2823,5r
would make the stay in the court of appeals automatic for 90 days
after the commencement of an appeal or until the court has ruled on
the motion, whichever is less. This proposed amendment would
eliminate the possibility of a short abatement period ending before
the court of appeals had ruled on the request for a stay, but it accom-
plishes little more toward relieving the employer's dilemma. Although
it removes the pressure to file an immediate motion for a stay, the
proposal does not eliminate the potential for a denial of due process
through coercion after the rejection of the request.
The ability of this proposal to achieve its very limited purpose de-
pends on whether 90 days is sufficient. If the court of appeals takes
longer to rule on the motion, the possibility of a short abatement
period ending before the court ruled would continue. At a minimum,
this amendment should be coupled with an explicit provision for the
expedited consideration of the motion for a stay.
B
A second alternative is to guarantee truly expedited proceedings at
both the review50 and appeal levels.57 With such a procedure an auto-
54. See note 49 supra.
55. Supra note 8, § 5(e).
56. Provision for expedited proceedings at the Commission level is made in 29 C.F.R.
§ 2200.101 (1974).
57. It is already provided that appeals are to be heard "expeditiously." Act § 10, 29
U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970). The House version of the bill which became the Act provided for
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matic stay,"s preserving due process, could be prescribed. Because a
final decision would be rendered within a short time, the risks involved
in exposing employees to dangerous conditions would be minimized.
Delayed abatement would be tolerable if all the proceedings were over
within a few months, rather than after more than a year.59 As the
number of contested citations, 831 in a representative four month
period in 1974,10 would seem to preclude quick proceedings in all
cases, expedited action could be confined to cases where the Secretary
requests it.
In the alternative, the stay procedure could remain discretionary, as
it is now, but with expedited proceedings guaranteed any employer
forced to proceed without a stay. To avoid coercing an employer into
abating before he had a hearing and judicial review, all proceedings
would have to be completed before the abatement period had termi-
nated.
While expedited proceedings assure due process and safety, their
availability must be real, not illusory. Court dockets are crowded and
the consideration of other cases, such as criminal, environmental, and
labor matters, often deserves more expedited action than is currently
possible. Assuring due process and safety by providing for complete
expedited procedures would, therefore, require a commitment to pro-
vide more funds at both the administrative and judicial levels.
C
A third alternative is to reimburse the employer for abatement costs
if he is ultimately successful after a stay has been withdrawn by the
Secretary or denied by a court of appeals. This would give an em-
ployer a purpose in litigating, preserve due process because an em-
ployer victory would be a meaningful one, and simultaneously assure
employee safety. The reimbursements could be funded, at least par-
tially, out of the penalties collected. 61 To mitigate the financial burden
upon the employer of having to abate beforehand, a program of short
an automatic stay. H.R. REP. No. 1765, supra note 50, at 39. Chairman Moran believes
that such an. automatic stay should be granted. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., I BNA Occ.
Saf. & Health Cas. 1326, 1329 (Rev. Comm'n 1973) (dissent). See McClintock & Bohrnsen,
supra note 2, at 371; J. Sharpe Queener, Safety Director, DuPont Co., representing the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Senate Hearings, supra note 50, at 330 (statement).
59. See Lance Roofing Co. v. Hodgson, 343 F. Supp. 685, 689 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
60. 4 BNA Occ. SAF. & HEALTH REP. 896 (1974). In addition, 37 cases are currently
pending in the courts of appeals. 4 BNA Occ. SAF. & HEALTH REP. 900 (1975).
61. See note 4 supra.
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term loans could be added to the current funds and guarantees avail-
able from the Small Business Administration. 2
Reimbursements for abatement costs are similar to provisions for
reimbursing successful litigants for their attorney's fees and costs.03 In
certain statutes, Congress has provided for the recovery of attorney's
fees and costs from the government if it loses a case.0 4 The difference
with reimbursing abatement costs is that such reimbursement would do
more than just make the employer whole. After having irreversibly
abated by making some improvement, the employer would be paid for
his costs and would keep whatever he had purchased. For example, if a
sprinkler system were installed at a cost of $5000, and the employer
were then paid that sum, he would have both $5000 and the fire
prevention system.
Congress might try to limit such windfall recoveries by reimbursing
an employer only for what he would not have otherwise spent-a
"normal course of business" rule. Such a policy, however, would be
difficult, if not impossible, to implement because an employer could
almost always argue that he would have spent nothing at that time. As
an alternative, some attempt could be made to create a "net benefit"
rule to determine what an employer's true costs were. For example, the
$5000 sprinkler system might reduce fire insurance costs. The decrease
in premium charges could be capitalized and subtracted from the
initial expenditure.
A "net benefit" or "normal course of business" rule would help
determine that portion of the expenditure which was coerced. Care
would have to be taken not to construe such rules so broadly as to
eliminate the reimbursement entirely, for without reimbursement the
employer has no substantial purpose in challenging the order to abate.
Either of these rules would mitigate the costs to the government of a
reimbursement program, but costs would also be minimized because
of the likely hesitancy of the Secretary and the court of appeals to
62. Act § 28, 15 U.S.C. §§ 633(c), 636(b)(6) (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 3142-1 (1970). See
Randall, Tax Aspects of OSHA Costs, 9 GONZAGA L. REV. 447 (1974) (discussion of the
lack of special tax benefits provided for mandated changes under the Act).
63. Certain statutes make such provisions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (action for
injuries due to violation of antitrust laws). For a general listing of statutory provisions
providing for the reimbursement of attorney's fees, see 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 54(d), note to
subdivision (d) (1971). Courts may also award attorney's fees and costs in their discretion.
See, e.g., Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974).
64. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970) (actions for damages based on an order of the
Secretary of Agriculture under the Stockyards Act). For proposals with respect to the Act
that employers be reimbursed for attorney's fees and costs if they are successful in court,
see, e.g., 1972 Oversight Hearings, supra note 1, at 73, 78 (Congressman Anderson); 1972
Oversight Hearings 88 (Congressman McClure referring to H.R. 15539, supra note 8).
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withdraw or deny a stay. The risk of loss to the government would be
justified only when abatement seemed desirable and the employer's
chances of success seemed slim.
Since federal funds would be used for the reimbursements, the
Secretary's power to determine whether an employer proceeds with or
without a stay should be expanded by Congress to include not only
the administrative level, but also appeals at the judicial level. With
reimbursement assured a victorious employer, the court of appeals
would have no reason to question the Secretary's determination. Need-
less to say, the Secretary would be wary about withdrawing or denying
a stay. Any payments by the government would act as a strong in-
centive to clarify the standards and procedures of the Act so as to
avoid future potential reimbursements.00
Conclusion
While the general enforcement procedures under the Act seem to
satisfy due process, the possibility for its denial lurks in the procedures
involved in obtaining a stay. As long as stays are never withdrawn by
the Secretary and are always granted by the courts of appeals, the
problem will not surface. However, forcing an employer to proceed
without a stay and thereby coercing abatement makes good sense in
some circumstances if employees are to be protected. In order to allow
such pressure, without violating due process, Congress should amend
the provisions of the Act concerning stays of the abatement period.
Either the definite availability of expedited proceedings in both the
Commission and the court of appeals, or a program of reimbursing
employers for their abatement costs, if forced to abate without a stay,
seems to satisfy the demands both of safety and of due process. While
the windfall benefits that would accrue to those employers who gain
reimbursements are troublesome, the policing effect upon a branch of
the federal bureaucracy might be worth the cost. Regardless of which
of the two alternatives is implemented, their availability makes it cer-
tain that Congress cannot justify weakening the procedural safeguards
of due process.
65. Cases where procedures or standards have been found defective include: Moser
Lumber Co., 1 BNA Occ. Saf. & Health Cas. 3108 (hearing examiner 1973) (standard
too vague) and Oberhelman-Ritter Foundry, I BNA*Occ. Saf. & Health Cas. 3087 (hearing
examiner 1973) (improperly promulgated standards).
66. Apprehension over reimbursements might thus result in a de facto program of
automatic stays. However, pressure from employees and their unions should be suf-
ficient to prevent the Secretary from thus abdicating his responsibility for employee
safety.
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